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ISBN 3–935821–64–6In this paper, we investigate the relationship between stock returns and short-term interest
rates. Identification of the stock return-interest rate relation is solved by using a new
technique that relies on the heteroskedasticity of shocks to stock market returns. We
suggest some improvements to the identification technique and its justification, as well as
providing some new findings. In particular, we ask whether the Bundesbank, prior to the
European Central Bank taking responsibility for monetary policy in 1999, reacted
systematically to stock price movements. In contrast to the results for the US, our
empirical findings for the 1985  −   1998 period show a positive, but statistically
insignificant, parameter for the relationship between German stock returns and short-term
interest rates at the daily frequency. The same result is found at the monthly frequency.
Nevertheless, the confidence bands are wide enough that we cannot entirely exclude the
possibility of a reaction at lower frequencies. The results are extremely robust to
alternative methods used to identify changes in heteroskedasticity. The evidence is,
therefore, inconsistent with the hypothesis of a systematic reaction of the Bundesbank to
every wiggle in German stock prices. Both the historical and institutional evidence are
supportive of this conclusion.
AbstractZusammenfassung
In diesem Diskussionspapier untersuchen wir den Zusammenhang zwischen
Aktienkursveränderungen und Veränderungen der kurzfristigen Zinssätze. Die
ökonometrische Identifikation dieses Zusammenhangs erfolgt mit Hilfe eines neuen
Verfahrens, das die Heteroskedastie von Aktienkursveränderungen ausnutzt. Wir schlagen
einige Verbesserungen und Rechtfertigungen zu diesem Verfahren vor und liefern neue
empirische Befunde. Im Vordergrund der Betrachtungen steht die Frage, ob die
Bundesbank vor der Übernahme der geldpolitischen Entscheidungen durch die
Europäische Zentralbank im Jahre 1999 systematisch auf Veränderungen der Aktienkurse
reagiert hat. Im Unterschied zu den verfügbaren Ergebnissen für die Vereinigten Staaten
von Amerika, finden wir auf Basis von Tagesdaten zwar einen positiven, aber statistisch
nicht signifikanten Parameter für die Reaktion des kurzfristigen Zinssatzes auf
Änderungen des Aktienkurses. Auf der Grundlage von Monatsdaten ist der Parameter
ebenfalls positiv und statistisch insignifikant. Die Konfidenzintervalle sind aber sehr breit,
so dass eine Reaktion auf der niedrigeren Frequenz nicht völlig ausgeschlossen werden
kann. Die empirischen Resultate sind sehr robust gegenüber  unterschiedlichen
Modellspezifikationen. Die empirische Evidenz widerspricht somit der These einer
systematischen Reaktion der Bundesbank auf jede Bewegung am Aktienmarkt, was durch
die historischen und institutionellen Gegebenheiten gestützt wird.1.  Introduction   1
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Did the Bundesbank React to Stock Price Movements?
*
1.  Introduction
Econometrics has made great strides in identifying the reactions of the monetary
authorities to economic developments from data that simultaneously reflects the behavior
of agents in the economy. Nevertheless, it is also becoming apparent that reaction function
estimates might inaccurately identify central bankers’ preferences. One reason is that other
factors that a central bank might react to are omitted from the reaction function, most
notably developments in asset markets. In addition, there is a lack of recognition that there
are pressures on the central bank to react to high frequency movements in asset prices in
particular.
Rigobon (2002), and Rigobon and Sack (2003), offer a solution to the identification
problem. An important feature of the Rigobon-Sack approach is that it relies on high
frequency data (viz., daily observations) and, in particular, on an identification procedure
that exploits the heteroskedasticity of shocks to stock market returns to identify regimes
when the central bank reacts to stock market developments. Using daily US data over the
1985 −   1999 period, Rigobon and Sack (2003) conclude that rising stock prices drive
short-term interest rates in the same direction, suggestive of a systematic reaction of the
Federal Reserve to stock price movements.
The behavior of stock prices in recent years, together with the growing relative
importance of financial wealth more generally, has re-ignited a debate about the role asset
prices ought to play in monetary policy decisions. This is not the first time, of course, that
                                                          
* The research for this paper was partly conducted while the first two authors were visiting the research
centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Both authors like to thank the Deutsche Bundesbank for their hospitality
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thanks the SSHRCC for financial support. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, the Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Queensland University of- 2 -
the impact of asset prices on the conduct of monetary policy, especially stock prices, has
become an important topic of debate. For example, in 1987, the Federal Reserve, was
given credit for stemming the perceived negative macroeconomic effects of the stock
market crash of that year. Further impetus for this debate comes from the increased
visibility and importance over the past several years given to the stock market’s role in the
monetary transmission process (Chami, Cosimano, and Fullenkamp, 1999; Mishkin,
2001). Even in the European context, while stock markets are thought to pay a less
prominent role than in the US, their importance is rising quickly suggesting that the gap
between the two continents in this respect is narrowing (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2001;
European Central Bank, 2002).
It has been popular to interpret monetary policy decisions by framing them around
some monetary policy rule, namely a Taylor rule. Such rules have also been found to
adequately describe the behavior of the Bundesbank (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), but
see Faust, Rogers, and Wright (2001)). Nevertheless, there is as yet little consensus about
whether central banks react to something other than to inflation and output and criticisms
have also been levelled at the manner in which existing reaction functions have been
estimated (see below). As a result, one branch of the literature asks whether, in addition to
an inflation and an output gap, a term representing stock price movements should also be
included (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001; Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and
Wadhwani, 2000; Bullard and Schaling, 2002; Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002). A possible
drawback with such an approach is that it relies on data typically sampled at the quarterly
frequency. Hence, the potential reaction of central banks and money markets to
occasionally large day-to-day shocks emanating from the stock market is diminished when
lower frequency data are used.
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On the other hand, one ought to consider whether it is at all advisable for central
banks to react to rapidly rising stock price movements, especially as they might be accused
of displaying myopic behavior (e.g., Siklos 1999, 2002).
1 Therefore, any reaction might be
muted or implemented over a longer period of time thereby becoming apparent only in
monthly or even quarterly data. A deeper question is whether it is even appropriate at all
for a central bank to react to asset prices. Thus, while inflation and output developments
affect everyone in society the same is not true of asset prices. A counter-argument is that if
developments in asset prices signal financial instability this may have repercussions
economy-wide.
The rising volatility of asset prices, such as stock prices, seems to have been
associated with a diminution of volatility in business cycle movements. It is possible that
this too is partly the result of central banks that have systematically responded to stock
price movements. Yet, there are few empirical studies that have estimated the size of this
response (and none for countries outside the US) owing to a serious identification
problem. The problem stems from the fact that while monetary policy might react to stock
prices, money markets are also supposed to anticipate future developments in monetary
policy. In other words, the stock price-interest rate relationship involves endogenous
variables. Moreover, conventional methods, such as instrumental variables approaches, are
unable to satisfactorily correct the endogeneity problem because of the near non-existence
of instruments highly correlated with asset prices but uncorrelated with interest rate
movements.
2
The aim of the paper then is twofold. First, we provide empirical evidence on the
stock price-interest rate link using German data covering a sample when the Bundesbank
                                                          
1 Indeed it is this kind of consideration that led Alan Greenspan (2002) to remark that “…nothing short of a
sharp increase in short-term rates … is sufficient to check a nascent [stock market] bubble”. Since monetary
policy displays a tendency for interest rate smoothing (e.g, Goodhart, 1999; Sack and Wieland, 1999), a
reflection of the natural caution of central bankers, this might suggest that central banks should not respond
to day-to-day fluctuations in asset prices.- 4 -
was solely responsible for the conduct of monetary policy in Germany, namely February
1, 1985 to December 30, 1998. As one of the world’s most successful central bank in
terms of controlling inflation, it has long practised monetary policy in a highly pragmatic
fashion that has involved monitoring all key economic indicators around a policy of
monetary targeting (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999).
3 In addition, we provide a brief
discussion suggesting that the theoretical motivation linking stock prices to monetary
policy is varied though a common thread is the concern that a central bank might express
over the volatility of stock returns. Nevertheless, institutional differences suggest that the
Bundesbank in particular, unlike its US counterpart, might be less inclined to react to
stock market developments.
Second, we modify Rigobon and Sack’s (2003) testing strategy in a number of ways.
In particular, we use different methods to identify volatility regimes. Whereas Rigobon
and Sack (2003) rely on a thirty-day rolling variance of the residuals from a VAR, and
recognize that this is an ad hoc procedure, we instead posit a Markov switching process to
identify different volatility regimes. In addition, we implement a bootstrapping procedure
to calculate the standard error of the parameter of interest that recognizes the fat tailed
nature of asset prices instead of the normality assumption made by Rigobon and Sack
(2003). Finally, our VARs capture the potential spillovers of stock market developments
in the US. Hence, even if the German stock market, per se, has a limited impact on
German monetary policy it is conceivable that stock market developments in the US,
where stocks play an increasingly important role in the transmission process, may
indirectly influence Bundesbank actions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the relationship between
stock price developments and monetary policy. The identification technique is outlined in
                                                                                                                                                                               
2 There are strong theoretical reasons to link stock prices and interest rates or inflation. Space constraints
prevent a full discussion. See, however, Sellin (2001) for a recent survey.- 5 -
section 3. Section 4 contains the empirical results, and section 5 concludes with a
summary and suggestions for future research.
2.  Monetary Policy and the Stock Market
A popular view of the determination of stock prices is that they reflect expectations of
future cash flows. Another important strand of the literature views stocks as a hedge
against inflation. Hence, stock returns may be viewed as a forward-looking variable and
there is empirical evidence that associates the stance of monetary policy, notably monetary
expansions, with stock market performance (e.g., Thorbecke, 1997). Nevertheless, the
evidence for the G7 countries, suggests that the forecasting properties of asset prices is
rather poor (Stock and Watson, 2001).
Important contributions by Allen and Gale (2000, 2002) suggest that since stocks
and real estate are often purchased with borrowed funds, there exists an incentive for
borrowers to shift risk to lenders who may not be able to observe the underlying riskiness
of the investments made by the borrowers. This produces an agency problem.
Consequently, they show that, as bank credit expands, asset prices react more strongly
than in the discounted expected payoff scenario. Hence, asset price volatility provides an
indication of the consequences of too rapid bank credit expansion. Of course, if bank
credit expands too quickly the central bank is duty bound to react by raising interest rates.
Nowhere is this view likely to be as strongly held as in the Bundesbank.
In a multi-country setting, Allen and Gale (2000, 2002) also show that relatively
more asset price inflation in one country can, if asset price volatilities differ, actually
exacerbate a fall in asset prices in another country. As such, interlinkages in asset price
markets can matter a great deal. Therefore, there may be good reasons for policy makers in
                                                                                                                                                                               
3 More recently, it has become fashionable to interpret the monetary targeting regime of the Bundesbank as
being consistent with a form of inflation targeting (e.g., see Bernanke and Mihov, 1997).- 6 -
one country to be concerned with asset price developments in other countries. Obviously,
stock market developments in the US would serve as the benchmark.
There is empirical evidence that stock market volatility is not immune to monetary
policy. For example, Bomfin (2002) concludes that, for the US, stock market volatility is
“abnormally” high around days the FOMC meets. Therefore, in principle, it seems
sensible to suggest that higher stock market volatility is suggestive of a central bank
reacting to stock market developments. Nevertheless, it is clear that the link between stock
returns and an interest rate instrument, heavily influenced by central bank actions, is an
endogenous one. That is, while the stock market may be attempting to anticipate the future
stance of monetary policy it is also clear that the central bank may itself react to current
stock market volatility via the interest rate instrument. As the foregoing suggests,
volatility, at least at the theoretical level, is the device that offers a link between asset price
movements and may motivate interest rates reactions by the central bank. To the extent
that higher stock returns are associated with more volatile returns, and the former is
perceived by the central bank as presaging higher future inflation, a central bank reaction
is warranted. The difficulty is that not all such developments signal higher future inflation.
The potential then for a central bank to react to stock returns, their volatility, or both, need
not be unambiguous.
Therefore, whereas Rigobon and Sack (2003) presume that the Federal Reserve
raises interest rates in response to higher stock market returns, the theoretical literature has
decidedly mixed views on the subject. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) suggest
that an inflation targeting policy ought to stabilize inflation and output even when stock
markets are volatile so that there is no benefit in responding to asset prices. Cecchetti,
Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani’s (2000) simulations reveal that explicit reaction to asset
price movements in a Taylor-type rule can, under certain circumstances (e.g., a shift in the
risk premium), assist the monetary authorities in reducing output volatility.- 7 -
Nevertheless, an overwhelming feature of much of the literature is the focus on the
reactions of the stock market to central bank actions and less so on the question of whether
the central bank itself responds to stock market developments. Indeed, there is a rich
literature that addresses the former issue (e.g., Smets (1997) and Giammarino (1998) and
references therein). Yet, the emphasis in the literature that addresses the reaction of central
banks to asset prices has tended to focus on whether it is desirable or even possible for the
monetary authority to prevent stock market bubbles (e.g., Filardo, 2001) with the literature
deeply divided on the practicability of such a policy. Bordo and Jeanne (2002) argue
forcefully that there is little to be gained from trying to anticipate the coming of a bubble.
Instead, they advocate the monitoring of indicators of financial stress since they believe
these are better suited to uncovering hints of the types of credit crunches that generally
follow a rapid drop in asset prices.
There is also relatively little discussion in the literature about the potential conflict
between a central bank responsible for maintaining low and stable inflation rates while
showing concern for output developments, both slow moving and persistent aggregates,
and a central bank that attempts to respond to data produced at high frequency. Siklos
(1999) refers to a central bank that responds too often as one that suffers from “tunnel
vision”. The quest to understand the implications of high frequency data for the conduct of
monetary policy reveals that policy makers are asking: since information is supplied by the
market apparently more frequently, should this necessarily elicit more frequent responses?
Why should central bankers care about, say, daily fluctuations in the exchange rate, interest
rates or stock prices, if these are unlikely to have permanent economic effects or threaten
the success of their stated policy objectives?
There are a couple of reasons for the resulting tensions between taking the long
view on policy questions and the need to be seen as responding to frequent shocks which
may, or may not, have lasting consequences for the economy. First, central banks are also- 8 -
viewed as the guardians of the stability of the financial system and, as such, may be
expected to react to news that might influence financial markets. Second, interest by
central banks in high frequency information resides in the fear that one small event,
whether “rational” or not, can trigger a financial crisis and, thus, threaten the stability of
the financial system (e.g., the “irrational exuberance” statement made by Alan Greenspan
in December 1996). Therefore, policy makers worry that the probability that one small
event can have disastrous consequences for the stability of the financial system is
sufficiently high to warrant the monitoring and response to high frequency data.
The discussion in this section shows that, to the best of our knowledge, no single
theoretical model in the literature fully addresses the relationship between stock market
behavior and monetary policy. Moreover, the connection to stock market volatility is
heavily dependent on views about how stock prices are determined. Nevertheless, Allen
and Gale (2002) show that the agency problem discussed above implies that a link exists
between asset prices and bank credit. The possibility of stock market bubbles, and their
prevention, is therefore tied to monetary policy actions. In other words, the volatility of
asset prices can play a central role in influencing interest rate determination. Rigobon and
Sack’s (2003) procedure relies precisely on this feature to identify the central bank’s
potential reaction of interest rates to stock prices.
At an institutional level, there are also grounds for scepticism about the potential for
interest rate reactions initiated by the central bank to stock market developments. First, as
noted above, central banks are viewed as acting cautiously as reflected by the widespread
belief that they smooth interest rates. Second, central banks make decisions at regular
intervals only (every two weeks in the case of the Bundesbank) and, unlike the Federal
funds market, there was less scope for the Bundesbank to react to daily developments in
money or bond markets.3.  Identifying Policy Reactions to Stock Prices via Heteroskedasticity
Rigobon and Sack’s (2003) technique to identify the reaction of monetary policy to stock
price movements relies on the heteroskedasticity in interest rate and stock returns over
time (see also Rigobon, 2002). The motivation behind of their identification technique is
similar to the one used to solve the identification problem in the standard example of
supply and demand curves. When shocks produce greater volatility in the stock market,
the covariance between interest rates and stock returns is assumed to rise and this implies a
positive link between interest rates and stock prices, the a priori sign predicted from such
a relationship. The increase in the volatility of stock market shocks thus serves the role of
an instrument, since the higher covariance between interest rates and stock prices is a
reflection of the greater responsiveness of monetary policy to the stock market that permits
identification of a reaction function of the central bank to asset price movements.
However, as noted earlier, the relationship between the central bank’s policy instrument
and stock prices is a simultaneous one and more structure is required to disentangle the
sources of correlation between the two series.
Consider the same dynamic structural equations as in Rigobon and Sack (2003):
t t t t t z x s i ε γ θ β + + + = (1)
t t t t t z x i s η φ α + + + = ,( 2 )
where  t i  denotes the short-term interest rate and  t s  the stock return.  t x  is a vector
containing lags of  t i  and  t s , as well as other observable macroeconomic shocks. The
variable  t z  summarizes unobservable shocks that may affect stock returns and the interest
rate. The inclusion of  t z  completes the specification of the model and rules out factors that
could also explain the covariance between monetary policy actions and the stock return.
- 9 -- 10 -
Equation (1) is the monetary policy reaction function, and is the focus of this paper,
(2) is the stock market reaction function, and the policy shock variable  t ε  is orthogonal to
the stock market shocks  t η . Note that reaction function (1) could be interpreted as a
version of the conventional Taylor rule augmented by the stock returns variable. However,
as the identification procedure relies primarily on high frequency data, there are no
obvious counterparts to the inflation and output gap terms. Hence, at best, (1) may be
viewed as a restricted version of a conventional monetary policy reaction function.
4 As
noted above, central banks may be accused of reacting too frequently to stock market
developments while seemingly ignoring other economic developments. Hence, it may also
be sensible to estimate versions of (1) and (2) at a lower frequency, say monthly, as any
central bank reactions to stock market prices may become more apparent at such
frequencies, especially for a central bank that is cautious.
If the parameter α  is different from zero, equation (1) cannot be estimated via OLS
since the parameter of interest, β , is a biased estimate of the reaction of the short-term
interest rates to stock price changes owing to the simultaneity problem discussed above.
Moreover,  t z  is unobservable which further contributes to a bias in OLS estimates of β .



























The residuals in equation (3) are as follows:
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4 Needless to say, one could argue that a central bank may very well have a daily reaction function in
addition to a monthly or quarterly policy rule. In this sense, (1) can be likened to the reaction implicit in a- 11 -
and the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals is:
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The covariance matrix provides only three moments (the variance of  t i , the variance of  t s ,
and the covariance between  t i  and  t s ) but there are three unknown coefficients, namely
α ,  β  and γ , as well as three unknown variances 
2
z σ , 
2
η σ  and 
2
ε σ . If the covariance does
not remain constant, a shift to a regime with a different covariance matrix provides three
new equations as well three new unknown parameters, namely 
2
z σ , 
2
η σ  and 
2
ε σ . However,
imposing additional assumptions to the variances of the shock process, such as assuming
that  t ε  is homoskedastic, ensures an identification of the system.
5 Hence, three additional
equations are generated when there is a shift in the covariance matrix. Identification in this
case then requires three volatility regimes.
As shown in Rigobon and Sack (2003) and also in Rigobon (2002) the β  parameter
must solve the following system of equations:
) /( ) ( 12 , 21 11 , 21 12 , 21 12 , 21 ∆Ω − ∆Ω ∆Ω − ∆Ω = β β θ ,( 7 )
) /( ) ( 12 , 31 11 , 31 22 , 31 12 , 31 ∆Ω − ∆Ω ∆Ω − ∆Ω = β β θ .( 8 )
This is a system of equations with two unknowns  ) , ( β θ  and is, therefore, just identified
when there are three volatility regimes. Each additional regime requires another equation
of the same type in which case the system becomes over-identified. In this case it is
possible to estimate it via GMM.
                                                                                                                                                                               
monetary conditions index that can be computed, and has been by a number of central banks, at the daily
frequency. See Siklos (2000), and references therein.
5  Additionally, the coefficients α ,  β  and γ  are treated as stable across the covariance regimes, an
assumption often invoked in the reaction function literature. The empirical evidence to be presented below
justifies such an assumption, at least for the data and sample employed here.- 12 -
The terms in (7) and (8) represent elements that produce changes in the covariance
matrices from regimes  1 = i  to regimes  3 , 2 = i . These can be identified with the help of
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Moreover, defining the change of the covariance matrix from regime  1 = i  to regime  2 = i
as  1 2 21 Ω − Ω = ∆Ω  and, equivalently, the change of the covariance matrix from regime
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, 1 η η η σ σ σ − = ∆ j j . Hence,  kl j , 1 ∆Ω  in equations (7) and
(8) is the element k  and l in matrix  3 , 2 = j .
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4.  Empirical Evidence
Our empirical investigation relies on daily data covering the period from February 1, 1985
to December 30, 1998. The sample is motivated by institutional and historical
considerations. Beginning in February 1985 the Bundesbank’s operating procedure
changed and relied primarily on repurchase agreements instead of discount and Lombard
rates to influence money market rates. Our sample ends when the European Central Bank
took over the responsibility of monetary policy from the Bundesbank on January 1, 1999.
The time series used in our study are the daily returns on the Deutsche Aktienindex
(Dax) at the close of trading day,  t s , the change in the three months money market rate as
the German short-term interest rate,  t i ∆ . The control variables in the vector  t x  are changes
                                                          
6 For further details on the solution of the identification problem see the appendix in Rigobon and Sack
(2001) and Rigobon (2002).- 13 -
in the US three months Treasury bill yield (secondary market rate), 
US
t i ∆ , the returns on
the US Dow Jones index, again at the close of trading,  t dow , the rate of change in the spot
DM-US-$ exchange rate,  t ξ , and the rate of change in world market oil price,  t oil . Stock
returns and oil price inflation are evaluated in first log differences of the levels.
Data were obtained from FRED II (research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/), Datastream, and
the Bundesbank. In computing rates of change no special adjustments were made for
weekends and holidays (alternative specifications were examined and these did not impact
the conclusions). Therefore, we omitted from the data set all non-overlapping daily
observations prior to computing daily rates of change in all variables, where relevant. This
yielded a total of 3365 observations.
7 In addition to the daily time series we provide
empirical evidence for the monthly frequency. The monthly time series are averages of
daily data.
To obtain some stylised facts about the relationship between stock returns, the short-
term interest rate, and stock market volatility, we estimate the rolling six months
correlation coefficients and the corresponding standard deviations of the stock returns. As
seen in Figure 1a, periods of consecutive negative and positive correlation coefficients
exist and this outcome is comparable to the findings of Rigobon and Sack (2003, Figure 3)
who used US data. However, in Rigobon and Sack’s case there seems to be a relatively
close relationship between the correlation coefficients and stock market volatility, while
for Germany periods of high (low) volatility and positive (negative) correlation are less
pronounced. It should be noted that Figure 1 relies on the first difference of interest rates
and not their levels as in Rigobon and Sack (2003).
8
                                                          
7  If we ignore holidays, the potential number of observations over the sample considered is shown in
parenthesis: s  (3476), dow  (3516), ξ  (3483), oil  (3629), and 
US i  (3478).
8 As noted earlier the identification technique used here relies on the volatility of stock returns. However, one
could instead rely on the volatility of interest rates to identify the relevant regimes. It seems unlikely that the
results would be qualitatively different (results not shown).- 14 -
Turning to monthly data, as shown in Figure 1b, the relationship is broadly the same
as in the case of daily data except that the correlations can be much higher (in absolute
values), and this is especially notable at times of large swings in the standard deviations of
returns. The resort to a lower frequency does reduce the heteroskedasticity in the data but
it is unclear that it destroys the underlying correlations that are highlighted by the
identification technique used here. The vertical bars in Figure 1a and 1b define the
boundaries that separate high from low volatility periods based on a Markov regime
switching model (see below). Generally, the Markov switching approach’s choice for high
versus low volatility regimes is not vastly different from that based on the rolling standard
deviation measure and the one used by Rigobon and Sack (2003).
Figure 1:  Rolling Correlation Coefficients and Standard Deviations
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The first stage of the estimation process involves obtaining the residuals from a
vector autoregression (VAR) of the reduced form (3):- 15 -
()
'
1 1 , , , , , | , i t i t
US
i t i t i t i t t t t oil i dow s i s i x − − − − − − − − ∆ ∆ ∆ = ξ ,    , 5 ,..., 1 , 0 = i (11)
where  t i ∆  and  t s  have been previously defined and we include five lags for each of  t i ∆
and  t s , and conditioned on the contemporaneous and five lags in  t dow ,  t ξ , 
US
t i ∆ , and  t oil
as exogenous variables. It is not immediately clear whether  t i  is stationary. Indeed, it is
common to first difference interest rate time series to induce stationarity (a unit root test
confirms this result). We follow this standard approach to the treatment of the interest rate
time series although first differencing of the nominal interest rate series may be objected
to on theoretical grounds. In any event, our conclusions are unaffected by this choice
(results for  t i  in levels are available on request). It should also be noted that the simple
correlation between  t i ∆  and  t s  is considerably higher in absolute terms than when interest
rates in levels are used (−  0.018).
9
                                                          
9 The simple correlation between i  and s  is – 0.018 while the correlation between  i ∆  and s  is – 0.083. A
potential drawback of the level specification is that it may result in the appearance of a zero correlation
between the variables of interest even if there exists a structural relationship between these same series. In
contrast, the first difference specification can preserve the underlying structural relationship that might exist
between interest rates and stock returns.- 16 -
Figure 1:  Rolling Correlation Coefficients and Standard Deviations (Continued)
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Note: In Panel 1a and 1b, the dashed line is the rolling standard deviation of the Dax using a six-month
window. The solid line is the rolling correlation coefficient between the daily rate of change in the Dax and
the change in the three months German money market rate. The vertical lines identify high versus low
volatility regimes. These are numbered I to V. In the case of daily data, the regimes are dated as follows:
November 16, 1987, March 20, 1989, February 18, 1991 and September 25, 1995. For monthly data the
dates are: November 1987, March 1989, February 1991 and October 1995.
As Rigobon and Sack (2003) point out, it is important to control for observable
macroeconomic shocks. While they resort to the use of forecast errors based on monthly
releases of five economic indicators, we prefer to assume that the arrival of such shocks is
more frequent and better proxied by daily data. In addition, since it is very likely that
money and stock market developments in the US will have a significant impact on
German interest rates and stock market returns we add the rate of change in the Dow index
as an exogenous variable, as well as a short-term US interest rate. Oil prices are also added
as a means of controlling for exogenous aggregate supply shocks on the stock market
while the exchange rate variable (again, in rates of change) also reflects potential indirect
inflationary influences via their pass-through effects on domestic prices and, consequently,
may also exogenously impact domestic stock prices.- 17 -
Regimes are identified, first, by examining the residuals from the stock return
equation in the VAR. Next, we use a Markov switching model to extract the regimes. The
Markov switching approach is arguably the most popular class of models used to detect
regime switches using non-observable variables. Details about the Markov switching
model are contained in Appendix A1.
10 While the univariate Markov-switching model
suggests that there are two states, namely one displaying high volatility the other low
volatility, this need not imply that the regimes identified in this manner are the same. The
technique is merely used to permit the subdivision of the sample into periods that appear to
display different time series characteristics. Moreover, as we shall see below, the chosen
regimes can be linked with important historical events.
Figure 2 plots the probabilities of being in the high volatility regime, while the
vertical lines delineate the high from low volatility regimes. Hence, regimes I, III, and V
are considered to be high volatility regimes. Recall that the estimation procedure requires
that at least three volatility regimes be identified. Some of the regime switches occur
around dates that appear imminently reasonable based on the historical experience. For
example, the first regime change occurs around the 1987 stock market crash. The second
date occurs around the time of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the
publication of the Delors Report setting out the process for European Monetary Union.
                                                          
10 The GAUSS programs are available at www.wlu.ca/~wwwsbe/faculty/psiklos/research.htm. The GAUSS
programs are adapted from the ones developed by Rigobon who makes them available at
http://web.mit.edu/rigobon/www/research.html#workinprogress. The program for the Markov switching
routine is explained in Appendix A1.- 18 -
Figure 2:  Smoothed Probabilities of High Volatility Regimes
Note: The line in this graph shows the probability of being in a high volatility regime. The probabilities are
bases on a Markov switching model described in Appendix A1. The vertical lines identify the chosen dates for
the high and low volatility regimes required for the identification procedure used in the paper. Hence,
regimes I, II, and V, are high volatility regimes while regimes II and IV are the low volatility regimes.
It is perhaps more difficult to pinpoint the main economic events that might be
associated with the switches in early 1991 and the fall of 1995. Nevertheless, the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the BCCI scandal figure prominently as events that
took place in 1991, while the Kobe earthquake and the collapse of Barings took place in
1995. Clearly, a drawback with the Markov switching approach is that it presumes that
high or low volatility regimes are all the same when this need not be the case. It is
conceivable, for example, that regimes V and I are fundamentally different since one
occurred after reunification while the other did not.
In order to guard against the possibility of spurious regime dating we experimented
with three other alternatives.
11 First, we considered the possibility that negative and
                                                          
11 We also considered the possibility of a sixth regime, between February 1991 and October 1995, assumed
to be in the high volatility state (see Figure 2) but our conclusions are unaffected. In addition, we varied by
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positive shocks in the basic VAR should be treated separately in using the Markov
switching technique to locate the timing of regime shifts. Second, we also experimented
with a bivariate Markov switching model.
12 Third, we examined the unit root properties of
the commercial paper-call money spread, a popular indicator of financial system stress, and
found that we could not reject the null of an asymmetric unit root. Estimating the threshold
consistently we then defined regimes switches according to whether error corrections were
positive or negative. Both the regime switching dates and the overall conclusions of this
study were largely unaffected by the method used to locate the timing of volatility regimes.
Hence, we report only results based on the standard Markov switching model as our results
are very robust to the dating of regime switches.
Turning to monthly data, the identification of regimes via the Markov switching
model did not produce as many clear-cut regime switches. However, visual examination of
Figure 1b suggests that the regime dating based on daily data can usefully serve to identify
regime changes at the monthly frequency. Hence, with the exception of the regime switch
in 1989, assumed to occur nine months later than for daily data, the dating of regimes is the
same at both frequencies.
Table 1 reports our estimation results. The second column contains the point
estimates of the reaction parameter,β , for all regimes and for all regimes without one
regime. These estimates are used for a test of constancy of β  over the regimes. For the
daily time series the point estimate of β  is positive and very small,  000005 . 0 ˆ = β . The
bootstrapped p-value for the null hypothesis  0 : 0 = β H  is 0.795 for the one-sided test with
the alternative hypothesis  0 > β . Hence, the null hypothesis clearly cannot be rejected.
13
We also computed a bootstrapped confidence interval and this yielded a range of
                                                          
12 Under this approach four states are permitted (two each dependent on the mean and the variance). These
were estimated using the MSVAR package written by Hans-Martin Krolzig. The results for this model are
relegated to an appendix but, in any event, our conclusions are unchanged.
13 Details on the bootstrap method for computing the p-values can be found in Appendix A2.- 20 -
[−  .009100; 0.00518]. Hence, it is difficult to find any support for a reaction to stock
market returns at the daily frequency.
For the monthly data the parameter of interest is also positive and statistically
insignificant with a p-value of 0.22. It should be noted that the value of the point estimate
0233 . 0 ˆ = β  is considerably larger than in the case of daily time series.
14 In addition, the
bootstrapped confidence interval yielded a range of [−  .9974; 1.8825]. The rather wide
confidence interval makes it difficult to rule out entirely a response by the Bundesbank to
stock returns.
                                                          
14 The point estimate when the interest rate enters in levels is −  0.2534 with a p-value of 0.82). While the null
that  0 = β  clearly cannot be rejected, the point estimate is considerably larger than the one shown in Table
1.- 21 -
Table 1:  Estimation Results for Daily and Monthly Time Series
Regimes    β ˆ     β ˆ ∆ 0 H p-value
Daily Data
All    0.000005 0 = β 0.79
All without I    0.001670 −  0.001664 0 = ∆ β 0.61
All without II −  0.000794    0.000799 0 = ∆ β 0.72
All without III    0.003997 −  0.003991 0 = ∆ β 0.48
All without IV −  0.003994    0.003999 0 = ∆ β 0.47
All without V −  0.000283    0.000288 0 = ∆ β 0.35
Monthly Data
All    0.0233 0 = β 0.22
All without I −  0.0484    0.0717 0 = ∆ β 0.32
All without II −  0.0704    0.0937 0 = ∆ β 0.44
All without III    0.0230    0.0002 0 = ∆ β 0.82
All without IV    0.0255 −  0.0021 0 = ∆ β 0.78
All without V    0.0234 −  0.0001 0 = ∆ β 0.88
Note:  β ˆ  denotes the estimated parameter of interest relating the change in short-term interest rates and
stock returns. For details on the estimation procedure and the data see Section 3 and 4, respectively. The
one-sided p-values are bootstrapped where a description can be found in Appendix A2. Regimes I to V are
defined in Figure 2.
To provide a check for robustness we have performed a test on changes in  β  by
excluding successively a different regime. This test of constancy is possible because we
have five regimes and three regimes are enough for identification. This allows us to use a
test for over-identifying restrictions (Rigobon and Sack, 2003). The results are reported in
the third column of Table 1 and are identified as the test of the null hypothesis
0 : 0 = ∆ β H . The β  does not change if a regime is excluded from the estimation
procedure, that is,  0 : 0 = ∆ β H . The results are shown in the fifth column. For both the
daily and the monthly data we cannot reject constancy over the regimes.
Although our findings differ somewhat from those in Rigobon and Sack (2003), there
are some common elements. First, we find that the point estimates of the reaction of- 22 -
interest rates to stock returns are robust across regimes. Second, there is a positive, though
largely insignificant, effect on interest rates from stock returns. The differences with the
empirical evidence reported in Rigobon and Sack (2003) are, however, worthy of
discussion. Our point estimates of β  in (1) based on daily data are considerably smaller
that theirs. Hence, at the daily frequency, short-term money market rates did not respond to
Dax returns. However, the impact is considerably larger at the monthly frequency with a
1 % rise in the Dax resulting in a 2.33 basis point rise in the short-term interest rate.
Notwithstanding open questions with the interpretation of β  as a policy reaction of
the Bundesbank to the stock market, we view our results as suggesting that the German
central bank did not respond to every wiggle in stock returns. However, it is somewhat less
clear whether the Bundesbank reacted to stock market developments at longer horizons
than at the daily frequency. This might reflect the Bundesbank’s pragmatic approach to
monetary policy (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995) as well as differences in the
implementation of monetary policy in the US versus Germany mentioned earlier.
5.  Summary and Conclusions
The nature of the relationship between asset price movements and monetary policy is
currently a hotly debated topic in macroeconomics. Even though this aspect of the
monetary transmission mechanism seems to be of importance for the conduct of monetary
policy, little empirical evidence is available that estimates the relationship between asset
price movements and monetary policy measures. This paper provides new empirical
findings on the role of stock price movements on interest rates using data from Germany
over the 1985  −   1998 period when the Bundesbank, as one of the most influential of
central banks in Europe, was responsible for monetary policy. We ask whether the
Bundesbank reacted to stock prices to gain additional insights into central bank behavior.- 23 -
The relevant empirical evidence is difficult to obtain because of an identification
problem that cannot be adequately solved with conventional methods such as instrumental
variables. Rigobon and Sack (2003) and Rigobon (2002) put forward a new identification
technique based on the heteroskedasticity of shocks to stock returns and find that the
Federal Reserve reacted to positive stock price movements by raising interest rates, and
vice-versa. We also implement what we believe are improvements to their approach and
consider the experience of the Bundesbank. Its institutional structure and monetary policy
strategy serves as the inspiration for the European Central Bank.
Our empirical results show that, for daily data, interest rates did not respond to stock
returns. When using monthly observations, the estimated coefficients are considerably
larger but remain statistically insignificant. However, given the wide confidence interval at
the monthly frequency the possibility that the Bundesbank might have reacted to stock
market developments at lower frequencies cannot be ruled out entirely. These results stand
in contrast with the US evidence provided by Rigobon and Sack. While it is possible that
our estimation approach provides one reason for the discrepancy between the German and
US evidence, though we rely on the same identification technique as the one developed by
both authors, we believe that the theoretical rationale linking central bank reactions to
asset prices is not yet sufficiently well-developed to provide definite guidance on the
question.
Other differences between our approach and the one in Rigobon and Sack include
the fact that our VAR uses daily data to provide control for exogenous influences on both
interest rates and stock returns unlike Rigobon and Sack who relied on variables available
at the monthly frequency. It is also possible that the institutional structure of the
Bundesbank and the German stock market may have led to a different response to stock
market movements than at the Federal Reserve. In particular, the 1987 stock market crash
dwarfs by a considerable margin all other events that raises the volatility in US stock- 24 -
returns, whereas the German stock market experienced three such shocks over the sample
considered. As a result, whereas more than 90 % of the US sample used by Rigobon and
Sack (2003) is concentrated around the 1987 period, only 20 % of our sample makes up
this regime.
15 As Rigobon and Sack point out, while it is difficult to assign all of the
weight of the reaction coefficient to central bank policies, we believe our results are
consistent with a central bank that does not suffer from tunnel vision but instead waits for
an accumulation of evidence about stock returns before changing interest rates.
                                                          
15 It is also possible that such features of the data explain why the Fed might have reacted to stock prices
while the Bundesbank did not since the threat to expected inflation from stock market performance may
simply have not been the same for Germany as it was for the US. We are grateful to Roberto Rigobon for
pointing out this possibility to us.- 25 -
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A1.  Classifying Volatility Regimes with Markov Switching Models
To classify the volatility regimes on which the identification procedure is based we use an
univariate Markov switching model (Hamilton, 1994). We suppose the existence of two
















P .( A 1 )
The transition matrix governs the process. For example,  11 p  is the probability that state 1 is
followed by state 1. The analysed variable  t y , in our case the residual of the stock return
equation in the VAR, is modelled as:
i t i t y , ε µ = − ,( A 2 )
where  i i t Var σ ε = ) ( , . The only difference between the two regimes are the mean and the
volatility. This model can be estimated with maximum likelihood and the (smoothed)
probabilities for the regimes are a result of the filtering method developed by Hamilton.
For more details about the estimation procedure see Hamilton (1994) Chapter 22. The
computations are performed by using the Ox package written by Hans-Martin Krolzig.
As an alternative we also identified volatility regimes via a bivariate Markov
switching model where µ  in equation A2 above is a vector of variables consisting of the
change in the interest rate and stock returns. In this manner we can permit four separate
regimes to exist in which either the volatility of interest rate changes or stock returns is
high or low or both are high or low. The results using this procedure are shown below and
may be directly compared with the ones provided in Table 1. The results below confirm the
statistically insignificant reaction of the Bundesbank to stock returns reported in the text.
- 28 -Table A1:  Estimation Results Using a Bivariate Markov Switching Model
Regime Standard Deviation Covariance Number of
Observations
Daily Data i ∆ s
1(high-high) 0.1076 1.9688    0.0188   210
2(low-high) 0.0138 2.2488 −  0.0073   424
3(low-low) 0.0045 0.8659 −  0.0002 1346
4(high-low) 0.0293 0.8331 −  0.0042 1374
00057 . 0 ˆ − = β , p-value 0.93,  confidence interval (−  0.00147, 0.00041) (95 %)
Monthly Data i ∆ s
1(high-high) 0.1001 0.3037 −  0.0011       6
2(low-high) 0.0041 0.0842 −  3.6016     29
3(low-low) 0.0072 0.2235 −  1.6415     99
4(high-low) 0.0125 0.2187 −  0.0015     29
00127 . 0 ˆ − = β , p-value 0.52,  confidence interval (−  0.001869, 0.00297) (95 %)
- 29 -- 30 -
A2.  Bootstrap Method for Computing p-Values
In general, a statistical hypothesis test compares a test statistic t with the distribution
) (F t , where F  is the (theoretical) distribution of the data under the null hypothesis. If the
distribution of the data is not known it is possible to use the empirical distribution F ˆ  of the
data. This can be done by resampling with replacement from the data, or in our case from
the residuals of the VAR. If we do this for  199 = R  bootstrap samples we can calculate R
times the test statistic (
* *
1 , , R t t  ) and can compare this empirical distribution with the
actual test statistic tˆ. The p-value is:
1







p r ,( A 3 )
where #(A) denotes the number of cases in which the condition A is fulfilled (see, for
example, Davidson and Hinkley, 1997).
However, in most cases a studentized bootstrap provides more stable test statistics.













.( A 4 )
In this expression 
*
r t  is the r-th bootstrap test statistic and 
*
r V  the corresponding variance.
We calculate the variance by using a double bootstrap. We resample from the r-th
bootstrap sample  25 = m  times and compute the variance for the corresponding values of
the test statistic. To calculate the p-value it is only necessary to compare the 
*
r Z  values
with  V t t z / ) ˆ ( 0 0 − =  ( 0 t  is the value of the test statistic under the null hypothesis) in the
same way as described above.- 31 -
Table A2: Results for Daily and Monthly Time Series with the Interest Rate in
Levels
Regimes    β ˆ     β ˆ ∆ 0 H p-value
Daily Data
All    0.00038 0 = β 0.64
All without I    0.00183 −  0.00144 0 = ∆ β 0.65
All without II −  0.00030    0.00068 0 = ∆ β 0.79
All without III    0.00386 −  0.00348 0 = ∆ β 0.53
All without IV −  0.00309    0.00347 0 = ∆ β 0.58
All without V    0.00010    0.00028 0 = ∆ β 0.32
Monthly Data
All −  0.2534 0 = β 0.82
All without I −  0.2405 −  0.0128 0 = ∆ β 0.99
All without II −  0.2298 −  0.0235 0 = ∆ β 0.81
All without III −  0.2448 −  0.0085 0 = ∆ β 0.84
All without IV −  0.2958    0.0423 0 = ∆ β 0.75
All without V −  0.2532 −  0.0001 0 = ∆ β 0.89
Note: The results are based on using interest rates in levels. For comparison and explanations see Table
1. The 95 % (bootstrap) confidence interval for the daily data is [−   0.01265; 0.00693] and the 95 %
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